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ADMISSIONS BY ACQUIESCENCE
SAMUEL L. HELLER*
A major exception to the rule of evidence which excludes hearsay
declarations concerns those extra-judicial assertions of one not a party to
an action, which are inconsistent with the claim or defense asserted
therein.' It is well recognized that admissions of a party-opponent embrace
not only the utterances and affirmative conduct of the party himself but
may also take the form of statements made by other persons which,
in effect, become those of the party and may therefore be offered in
evidence against him.2 These vicarious admissions3 may be relational in
nature in that admissibility is founded upon the presence of some
relationship between the declarant and the party; thus, the statements
of one who is an agent 4 of, or in privity5 with the party-opponent may
operate as the latter's admission. But wholly apart from those admissions
which are predicated on relationship, statements by another in the presence
and hearing of a party6 may also be received in evidence to establish the
latter's admission by words or conduct which manifest his approval or
adoption of the hearsay statement or signify his belief in its truth. 7 Since
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. See generally 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1052-68 (3d ed. 1940) Morgan,
Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921).
2. People v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512 (1894); Doherty v. Edwards, 227
Iowa 1264, 290 N.W. 672 1940 ; Eaton v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 7, 90 S.W. 972
(1906); People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943 (1911); In re Newman's Will,
187 Ore. 641, 213 P.2d 137 (1950). Several jurisdictions have made explicit statutory
provision for the admissibility of vicarious admissions. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1870(2);
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-409 (1954); MONT. REV. CODE tit. 93, § 401-27 (1947); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 41.900(3) (1959).
3. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1069; Morgan, Rationale of Vicarious
Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461 (1929).
4. E.g., Martin v Savage Truck Line, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954);
Gordon v. Hotel Seville, Inc., 105 So.2d 175 (Fla. App. 1958); Whitaker v. Keogh,
144 Neb. 790, 14 N.W.2d 596 (1944); Arenson v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 131 N.J.L.
303, 36 A.2d 761 (Errors & App. 1944).
5. E.g. Smith v. Goethe, 159 Cal. 628, 115 Pac. 233 (1911) (statements by
former holders of note); Howard v. Franklin Ins. Co., 226 S.W. 447 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920) (statements by mortgagor deemed admissions of mortgagee); Johnson v. Tuttle,
108 Vt. 291, 187 Atl. 515 (1954).
6. A party's admissions may also, under very limited circumstances, be inferred
from a failure to reply to written communications such as letters and statements of
account on much the same principles discussed herein. See generally 4 WIGMORE, OP.
cit. supra note 1, § 1073. However, such admissions have traditionally received less pro-
bative weight than admissions from silence in the face of oral statements and for this
reason, evidence of a defendant's failure to reply to a letter accusing him of a crime
is generally excluded in criminal trials; e.g., Poy Coon Tom v. United States, 7 F.2d
109 (9th Cir. 1925); Terrell v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 599, 228 S.W. 240 (1921).
7. Both forms of admission were conveniently expressed in the maxim Qui tacet
consentire videtur (silence gives consent), from which there early developed a working
rule of practice in English and American courts that virtually anything said in a party's
presence was admissible in evidence; 4 WItMORE, OP. cit. supra note 1, § 1071. According
to Professor Wigmore, it is only in recent times that the courts have begun to develop
restraints on this practice; ibid. That the fundamental distinction between admissions which
are founded on belief by a party and those based upon approval is incorporated in the
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the statement is none the less hearsay, it is given no substantive weight
as evidence; its reception is permitted for the limited contextual purpose
of giving meaning and effect to the party's conduct or passiveness.8 While
the term "adoptive admission" has been employed by no less an authority
than Professor Wigmore to characterize both of the foregoing forms of
admission, 9 it more properly should be restricted to the former. It can
well be argued that admissions based upon a party's silence or equivocal reply
to a hearsay statement are acquiescent or tacit in nature' 0 and that their
admissibility must necessarily rest upon something less than approval or
adoption of the statement itself." Where, for example, an accused remains
silent in the face of damaging accusations by a police officer or an
accomplice, 12 "his silence . . . may furnish ample ground for an inference
of consciousness of its truth even though it would afford no sufficient
basis for an inference of adoption.""1a
Before proceeding to an examination of the various requirements for
the admissibility of acquiescent admissions, it is important to note the
fact that the courts traditionally have regarded this form of admission
with considerable caution. 14 Since such evidence is circumstantial, its
probative value is not great;15 moreover, its use will invariably require
the introduction of the hearsay statement so that the danger is always
present that a lay jury will not confine itself to the inference of the party's
belief that is to be drawn but will give substantive weight to the hearsay
Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence is recent evidence of the
restrictive trend; MODEL CODE or EVIDENCE rule 507(b) (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 63(8).
8. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847); People v. Conrow,
200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943 (1911).
9. Compare 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1071, with McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 246-47 (1954).
10. See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847);,People v.
Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943 (1911); Mudd v. Cline Ice Cream Co., 101 W.
Va. 11, 13, 131 S.E. 865, 866 (1926) ("silent admissions").
11. MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 9, § 247: "The justification for receiving
such evidence is not based upon the assumption that the party has intended to express
his assent and thus has adopted the statement as his own, nor upon the theory that a
duty or obligation to speak has been cast upon him, but rather upon the probable state
of belief to be inferred from his conduct." (Emphasis added.) But see 4 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 1071.
12. Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Edwards v. State,
155 Fla. 550, 20 So.2d 916 (1945); People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943
(1911); State v. La Plant, 149 Ore. 615, 42 P.2d 158 (1935).
13. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507, comment b at 247 (1942).
14. People v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512 (1894); Albano v. State, 89
So.2d 342 (Fla. 1956); Freidman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948);
People v. Lewis, 238 N.Y. 1, 143 N.E. 771 (1924); State v. Sudduth, 74 S.C. 498, 54
S.E. 1013 (1906); Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457 (1838). In Massachusetts, recent decisions
indicate an increasing reluctance to expand the adoptive-acquiescent admission concept.
Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Catino, 330 Mass. 230, 112 N.E.2d 790 (1953);
Trustees of Church of Disciples v. Benevolent Fraternity of Unitarian Churches, 319
Mass. 38, 64 N.E.2d 623 (1946).
15. State v. Kysilka, 84 N.J.L. 6, 87 Atl. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1913); State v. Sudduth,
74 S.C. 498,_54 S.E. 1013 (1906); Camper v. State, 187 Tenn. 511, 216 S.W.2d
18 (1948).
In Florida, the accused in a criminal trial is entitled to have the jury instructed
that "the probative weight of such evidenee is not great and . . . it should be received
with caution." Albano v. State, 89 So.2d 342, 344 (Fla. 1956).
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itself.16 Suppose that in a criminal trial the prosecution seeks to introduce
evidence of an accomplice's detailed and voluminous statement concerning
the alleged crime, which was read to the accused from a transcript and
to which he remained silent." Unquestionably, the point is reached at
which jury discrimination between the hearsay statement and the defendant's
belief therein becomes purely a matter of conjecture. A similar abuse once
prompted Mr. Justice Cardozo to remark: "Discrimination so subtle is a
feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of
those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds. . . . When the
risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the
evidence goes out."' 8
While reception of the tacit admission, particularly in criminal trials,
nearly always will be attended by some risk that it will be improperly
used to the prejudice of the party-opponent, the courts have found ample
justification for its admissibility;19 "human experience has shown that
generally, it is natural to deny an accusation if a party considers himself
innocent of negligence or wrongdoing." 20 With what some writers maintain
is an unrealistic and over-strict approach, 21 the courts have formulated
relatively rigid criteria for the admissibility of admissions based on silence
or equivocal reply. Generally, before a jury in a civil or criminal trial is
permitted to consider any evidence of the party's admission, 22 it must
16. See Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485, 153 A.2d 833 (1959); State v.
McCullum, 18 Wash. 394, 51 Pac. 1044 (1897).
17. The practice is forcefully condemned on both legal and ethical grounds in
People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 720, 172 P.2d 18, 30 (1946).
18. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
19. E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Weller v.
Fish Transp. Co., 123 Conn. 49, 192 Atl. 317 (1937); Edwards v. State, 155 Fla.
550, 20 So.2d 916 (1945); Muse v. McWilliams, 295 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
20. Keller v. Key System Transit Lines, 129 Cal. App.2d 593, 277 P.2d 869 (1954).
21. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 9, § 247 n.16; 4 WIMORE, Op. Cit. supra
note 1, § 1071: "The principal question is whether the specified conditions for implying
assent should be required to appear . . . before receiving the . . . statement made in
the party's presence. Such strictness was proper enough . . . when the party himself
was disqualified as a witness and therefore could not by his own testimony protect
himself against undue inferences drawn from his silence. But today there is ample
opportunity thus to counteract the risk of misconstruction. . . . It would seem to be
the better rule at least that any statement made in the party's presence and hearing
is receivable . . . placing upon the opponent of the evidence the burden of showing
to the judge its impropriety."
22. The various elements of the tacit admission are for the most part dependent
on the existence of certain facts; notwithstanding the principle that issues of fact
are ordinarily left to the jury, it is generally recognized that preliminary questions of
fact incident to a determination of admissibility are exclusively the province of the
trial judge. Runels v. Lowell Sun Co., 318 Mass. 466, 62 N.E.2d 121 (1945); State
v. Proctor, 269 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1954); 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2550.
As to each element, the judge must initially determine that a jury could find the necessary
facts and inferences; otherwise, the evidence must be excluded. Accord, Weightnovel
v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 35 So. 856 (1903); Freidman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30
N.W.2d 752 (1948); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847)
(dictum); Johnson v. Underwood, 102 Ore. 680, 203 Pac. 879 (1922); State v. Sudduth,
74 S.C. 498, 54 S.E. 1013 (1906). Contra, Byrd v. State, 78 Ga. App. 824, 52 S.E.2d
330 (1949); Belk v. Belk, 175 N.C. 69, 94 S.E. 726 (1917) (semble).
The fact that the trial judge finds facts which support admissibility does not, of
course, preclude the jury from thereafter giving the evidence little or no weight by
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clearly and affirmatively appear to the trial judge that (1) a statement
was made in the party's presence which (2) was heard by him and
understood and which (3) related to facts within his knowledge; that
(4) the party was physically able and at liberty to respond and that
(5) the circumstances were such that his silence or equivocal reply make
probable his belief in the truth of the statement.23
Before any evidence of the party-opponent's conduct can be considered,
the courts uniformly require the proponent of the evidence to establish
that the hearsay statement was made in the immediate presence of the
party.24 If the declarant and the party were in adjacent rooms2 5 or
separated by an unreasonable distance,26 the "presence" requirement has
not been met and the admission fails.
A corollary consideration is that the statement must have been
heard by the party. It is ordinarily assumed in trial courts that what is
shown to have been said in a party's presence was in fact heard by him
and the assumption is certainly plausible when the party responded with
an equivocal reply.27 But when the admission is based on silence, the
courts generally have required more than a mere showing of the party's
presence as evidence of his having heard the statement. 28 If the party
was more than a short distance away from the declarant 29 or in an
adjacent room,30 the evidence must be excluded even though the party
finding that the facts do not exist or by refusing to draw the necessary inference there-
from. State v. Proctor, supra; State v. Toohey, 6 N.J. Super. 97, 70 A.2d 180 (1950);
Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility,
36 YALE L.J. 1101 (1927). But cf. Thurmond v. State, 212 Miss. 36, 53 So.2d 44(1951)23. See Commonwealth v. Kenney, supra note 22, at 237: "[Wlhere a . . .
declaration is made in one's hearing and he makes no reply, it may be a tacit admission
of the facts. But this depends on two facts; first, whether he hears and understands the
statement, and comprehends its bearing; and secondly, whether the truth of the facts
embraced in the statement is within his own knowledge, or not; whether he is in such
a situation that he is at liberty to make any reply; and whether the statement is made
under such circumstances, and by such persons, as naturally to call for a reply ....
24. Weller v. Fish Transp. Go., 123 Conn. 49, 192 Atl. 317 (1937); Weightnovel
v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 35 So. 856 (1903); Quillin.v. Colquhoun, 42 Idaho 522, 247 Pac.
740 (1926); Lanergan v. People, 39 N.Y. 39 (1868); Josephi v. Furnish, 27 Ore. 260,
41 Pac. 424 (1895); Dr. Sweet Root Beer, Inc. v. Kittanning Brewing Go., 83 Pa.
Super. 349 (1924); Eardley v. Eardley, 253 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Kutchen-
meister v. Los Angeles & S.L. Ry., 52 Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725 (1918).
25. Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 35 So. 856 (1903); Lanergan v. People, 39
N.Y. 39 (1868).
26. ila Valley Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914) (20 yards); Josephi v. Furnish,
27 Ore. 260, 41 Pac. 424 (1895) (12 feet); State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 Pac.
977 (1907) (alternative holding).
27. E.g., People v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512 (1894) (admission upheld
where defendant replied: "Do you suppose I was a . .. fool, to tell you I was there?").
28. Roberts v. State, 94 Fla. 149, 113 So. 726 (1927); Quillin v. Colquhoun,
42 Idaho 522, 247 Pac. 740 (1926); Doherty v. Edwards, 227 Iowa 1264, 290 NW.
672 (1940); Gerulis v. Viens, 130 Me. 378, 156 AtI. 378 (1931); Sanders v. Overaker,
141 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Reall v. Deiriggi, 127 W. Va. 662, 34 S.E.2d
253 (1945). But see 4 ,VIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1072 (3d ed. 1940): "this seems too
strict; the presence of a party may be assumed to indicate that he heard and understood."
29. See note 26 supra.
30. See note 25 supra.
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might have heard the statement had he listened closely. 31 Similarly, if
it appears that the party was unfamiliar with the language spoken he
cannot be held to have understood, and his silence cannot be given legal
significance.a2
Assuming that a statement was made in the presence and hearing
of a party, it must also appear to the trial judge that the hearsay statement
then related to facts within the party's knowledge. While the courts
which have imposed this requirement do not make a distinction, the
requirement quite obviously applies only to those admissions based on
silence. 33 It is at this point, however, that Professor Wigmore maintains
the courts are in error;34 according to his thesis, it is fallacious to exact
an element of personal knowledge for a party's tacit admissions since
generally, admissions are not dependent 'upon the party's first-hand knowl-
edge.35 The latter observation is correct and supported by the great
weight of authority.36 But the argument advanced and the myriad decisions
upon which it rests relate to a party's own statements which constitute
his admission, the principle being that a party's actual knowledge of
matters he has related. is not a prerequisite for admissibility. But when
admission is founded not on the party's words but on his silence in
response to another's statement, the practical and theoretical necessity
of establishing his knowledge of the matter asserted is evident. If he lacks
such knowledge, the statement is a meaningless communication of words
to which his silence logically signifies nothing, let alone belief or assent.
This principle was evident in Dierks Lumber 6 Coal Co. v. Horne,3 7
an action for the conversion of a large number of plaintiff's lumber poles.
Because of prior dealings and the quantity involved, the exact number
was so inascertainable that plaintiff arrived at a figure derived wholly
from its own data and formulas. Evidence that the defendant had
remained silent when accused of misappropriating this quantity was held
31. State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 Pac. 977 (1907) (no duty to open door
and denounce declarant).
32. Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 35 So. 856 (1903); State v. Kysilka, 84 N.J.L.
6, 87 Atl. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1913); People v. Lewis, 238 N.Y. 1, 143 N.E. 771 (1924).
33. Parulo v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 145 Fed. 664 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1906); Dierks
Lumber & Coal Co. v. Horne, 216 Ark. 155, 224 S.W.2d 540 (1949); Roberts v. State,
94 Fla. 149, 113 So. 726 (1927) (dictum); Burwell v. First Nat'l Bank, 86 Ind. App.581, 159 N.E. 15 (1928) (semble); Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Catino, 330 Mass.
230, 112 N.E.2d 790 (1953); Hill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 N.C. 1, 63 S.E. 124(1908); Real] v. Deiriggi, 127 W. Va. 662, 34 S.E.2d 253 (1945). In Freidman v.
Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948), plaintiff attempted to establish
a councilman's admission that the city's generators had caused extensive cracks in
plaintiff's building; the member had seen the cracks prior to 1937 but remained silent
during a 1941 hearing at which the complaint was made. The court held that no
admission arose, the member having no present knowledge of the conditions complained
of in 1941.
34. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 28, § 1072.
35. Id. at p. 79.
36. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 241 n.9 (1954).
37. 216 Ark. 155, 224 S.W.2d 540 (1949).
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properly excluded since the number was derived from information unavail-
able to the defendant.3
8
Factors relating to a party's physical condition at the time the state-
ment was made may also bear upon the admissibility of the offered
admission. Obviously, a party's silence should have no legal significance
when the evidence discloses that his ability to hear, comprehend or respond
to the hearsay statement was substantially impaired. Thus, the courts
generally have excluded the evidence when the party was asleep, deaf,
3 9
unconscious4 0 or in a state of shock 4 when the statement was made.
Very often in accidents involving serious personal injury, the participants
exchange accusations of fault which are later sought to be used against
the party addressed as an admission of liability. Apart from the excitement
and confusion,4 2 the fact that the party was in pain 43 or a state of hysteria
44
is generally recognized by the courts as a basis for excluding the evidence.
Similarly, it would seem that when the party was intoxicated at the time
the statement was made in his presence, the inference of acquiescence
from his passiveness is too improbable to be permitted. While some courts
have rejected the admission on this basis, 4 5 others unfortunately have
favored admissibility, finding no difficulty in imposing a duty to reply
on the inebriate. 46 The.rationality of permitting the inference of acquiescence
when one's physical and mental faculties are so obviously impaired is open
to question.
38. Ibid.
39. See People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 48 N.E. 730 (1897).
40. Gowen v. Bush, 76 Fed. 349 (8th Cir. 1896) (alternative holding); lines v.
Patterson, 146 Ark. 367, 225 S.W. 642 (1920); Wheeler v. Le Roy, 296 Ill. 579, 130
N.E. 330 (1921). In People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 48 N.E. 730 (1897), where
there was some evidence that the party was feigning unconsciousness, the court indicated
that even if that were the case, no admission could be inferred from the party's silence
since "naturally, neither he nor any other person similarly situated would have replied."
Id. at 377, 48 N.E. at 737.
41. Schilling v. Union Ry. 78 N.Y. Supp. 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
42. These circumstances alone may justify exclusion of the evidence. Accord, Whaley
v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 294 S.W.2d 775 (1956); Gerulis v. Viens, 130 Me.
378, 156 Atl. 378 (1931); Klever v. Elliott, 212 Ore. 490, 320 P.2d 263 (1958);
Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939). But cf. Willhite v. Freed, 137 Ore.
I, 299 Pac. 691 (1931).
43. Gowen v. Bush, 76 Fed. 349 (8th Cir. 1896); Hines v. Patterson, 146 Ark.
367, 225 S.W. 642 (1920); Mumford v. State, 70 Fla. 424, 70 So. 399 ("blinded
by blood and screaming lustily"); Wheeler v. Le Roy, 296 Ill. 579, 130 N.E. 330 (1921)
(alternative holding); Doherty v. Edwards, 227 Iowa 1264, 290 N.W. 672 (1940);
Lichtenstein v. Cascio, 83 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div. 1948); McCord v. Seattle Elec.
Co., 46 Wash. 145, 89 Pac. 491 (1907). Contra, Holston v. Southern Ry., 116 Ga.
656, 43 S.E. 29 (1902); Givens v. Louisville & N. Ry., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1796, 72 S.W.
320 (1903).
44. Schilling v. Union Ry., 78 N.Y. Supp. 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1902); McCord v.
Seattle Elec. Co., 46 Wash. 145, 89 Pac. 491 (1907).
45. Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 87 S.W. 438 (1905); State v. Kissinger, 343
Mo. 781, 123 S.W.2d 81 (1938); People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48 (1949).
46. State v. Sawyer, 230 N.C. 713. 55 S.E.2d 464 (1949); Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 99 S.W.2d 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936): "The statements ...naturally
called for [a] reply by him, and there is nothing to suggest .. .he was [unable]
• ..to reply." Id. at 1082.
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The courts have also excluded the offered admission by silence when
the party-opponent was restrained from speaking; convictions based in part
on silence during police interrogations have been reversed when the
defendant was denied the opportunity to speak,47 or forcibly admonished
to keep quiet.48 To a lesser degree, if the party's silence stemmed from
his own fear of making any reply, the courts have indicated the evidence
should be excluded. 49
The circumstance of arrest itself is regarded as controlling by many
jurisdictions which refuse to draw any inferences from an accused's silence
to accusatory statements made after his arrest. These courts have adopted
the liberal policy of categorically excluding all evidence of silence after
arrest on the premise that an innocent person will rely more often than not
upon the familiar admonition that anything he says may be used against
him.50 Other courts have adopted the more flexible and yet conservative
view that arrest, per se, does not preclude admissibility but is merely one
of many circumstances that affect admissibility.5 '
In addition to the foregoing requirements for the reception of tacit
admissions but actually encompassing them is the fundamental considera-
tion that "under all of the circumstances appearing, the party's conduct
47. State v. Kysilka, 84 N.J.L. 6, 87 Atl. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
48. People v. Kozlowski, 368 I11. 124, 13 N.E.2d 174 (1938); People v. Kennedy,
164 N.Y. 449, 58 N.E. 652 (1900).
49. Autrey v. State 94 Fla. 229, 114 So. 244 (1927) (dictum); Commonwealth
v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847); Muse v. McWilliams, 295 S.W.2d 680
STex. Civ. App. 1956). In Smith v. American Stores Co., 156 Pa. Super. 375, 40 A.2d
96 (1945), an action for injuries sustained in the defendant's store, liability depended
upon the negligence of a stock boy; when defendant's manager saw the injured plaintiff
and the cuttings she had slipped on, he angrily accused the boy of throwing them on
the floor. The trial court permitted the jury to infer the boy's admission of negligence
by his having remained silent; on appeal, the court reversed, noting that the boy's fear
of his superior was evident and that "it was only natural . . . to postpone his answer
to a calmer occasion." Id. at 380, 40 A.2d at 698.
50. United States v. LoBiondo, 135 F.2d 130 (2d. Cir. 1943); Yep v. United
States, 83 F.2d 41 (10th Cir. 1936); McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th
Cir. 1928); State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 At. 336 (1922); Territory v. Corum,
34 Hawaii 167 (1937); State v. Poynter, 34 Idaho 504, 205 Pac. 561 (1922); Rickman
v. State, 230 Ind. 262, 103 N.E.2d 207 (1952); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass.
(12 Met.) 235 (1847); People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933);
Zeller v. State, 123 Ohio 519, 176 N.E. 81 (1931); Crabb v. State, 86 Okla. Crim.
323, 192 P.2d 1018 (1948); State v. Marcello, 72 R.I. 382, 51 A.2d 828 (1947);
Redding v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 576, 197 S.W.2d 357 (1946).
It has even been advanced that silence under arrest should be regarded as an
implied claim of the privilege against self-incrimination; Ellis v. State, 8 Okla. Crim.
522, 128 Pac. 1095 (1913).
51. Muse v. State, 29 Ala. App. 271, 196 So. 148 (1940); Hawthorn v. State,
206 Ark. 1009, 178 S.W.2d 490 (1944); Cawthon v. State, 71 Ga. App. 497, 31
S.E.2d 64 (1944); State v. Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 130 A.2d 80 (1957); Com-
monwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943); State v. Sudduth, 74 S.C.
498, 54 S.E. 1013 (1906). In Florida, admissions by silence after arrest are admissible
and it has been held that the accused cannot ignore the accusations made in his presence;
Edwards v. State, 155 Fla. 550, 20 So.2d 916 (1945) (without reference to other
circumstances that might affect admissibility).
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makes it probable that he believed the statement to be true. '52 As to all
of the myriad "circumstances" developed by the courts into workable
standards of admissibility, including those heretofore discussed, the con-
trolling principle is, of course, that of relevancy. Consequently, the circum-
stances surrounding the offered admission should be given judicial recogni-
tion only to the extent such recognition facilitates exclusion of evidence
which does not tend sufficiently to establish the fact of admission by
the party-opponent.5 3 It is from such basic considerations of relevancy that
Professor Wigmore concludes that "the inference of assent may safely be
made only when there is no other explanation equally consistent with
silence. . . . 4
Notwithstanding the fact that the hearsay statement is of secondary
significance compared to the party's response or passiveness thereto,55 certain
distinctions based on relevancy have been made with regard to the type
of statement and by whom it is made. Thus, it has been held that a
party need not reply to the unintelligible remarks of one who is intoxicated,5e
statements broadcast over a radio,5 7 or the statements of unknown
bystanders which are not addressed to the party. 8 However, the fact
that the declarant would be incompetent to testify as a witness does not
itself preclude the use of the declaration to show a party's admission
by silence, and it is on this basis that the silence of an accused to a
child's accusations is admissible."" Similarly, many courts have indicated
that the hearsay statement must have been one of fact based on the
52. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 247 (1954).
53. In Burton v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 371 Pa. 60, 88 A.2d 873 (1952),
the court held that it was proper to exclude evidence that shortly after plaintiff slipped
on the defendant's floor, the store manager remained silent to statements by plaintiff's
daughter concerning the floor's slippery condition; the "manager's silence may well have
been motivated by a desire to avoid a dispute with the customer whose mother hadjust been injured .. " Id. at 664, 88 A.2d at 875. For a penetrating analysis of the
various judicial definitions of relevancy and their application, see Trautman, Logical
or Legal Relevancy-a Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. Rzv. 385 (.1952).
54. 4 WIOMORE, op. cit. sup a note 28, § 1071.
55. See note 8 supra.
56. Francis v. Edwards, 77 N.C. 271 (1877).
57. State v. La Plant, 149 Ore. 615, 42 P.2d 158 (1935) (by implication).
58. Whaley v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 294 S.W.2d 775 (1956); Gerulis v.
Viens, 130 Me. 378, 156 At. 378 (1931); Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485, 153
A.2d 833 (1959); Hersey v. Barton, 23 Vt. 457, 463 (1851) (dictum). For a common
sense approach to bystanders' remarks at automobile collisions, see Beck v. Dye, 200
Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939), wherein the court recognized a moral as well as statutory
duty to render aid to the injured and avoid verbal combat with bystanders. Contra,
Wilhite v. Freed, 137 Ore. 1, 299 Pac. 691 (1931).
Nor will admission be inferred if the hearsay statement identifies or refers to some
person other than the party in whose presence it is made; in Robinson v. State, 235
Miss. 100, 108 So.2d 583 (1959), the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of
the defendant's silence to his stepson's statement "Daddy shot mother dear," since it
had been shown the child referred to his natural father as "Daddy" and to the defendant
as "Henry."
59. State v. Claymonst. 96 N.I.L. 1, 114 Atl. 155 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Hardy v.
State, 150 Wis. 176, 136 N.W. 639 (1912)..- . : .
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declarant's personal knowledge, excluding evidence of 'a party's silence to
mere opinions6" and statements based on second-hand knowledge.61
Other circumstances surrounding the offered admission may preclude
its reception. Since it would be "indecorous" '2 for a party to interrupt
a judicial proceeding 63 with a denial of statements 'made therein, it has
been held that his silence to statements by witnesses or even his own
attorney thereafter cannot be used to establish his admission. 64 It has
been held likewise that a party need not reply to his spouse's narration
of family intimacies in the presence of others. 65
No response a party can make to a hearsay statement more effectively
precludes his admission than an immediate and unequivocal denial and
the courts have consistently rejected all evidence of admission when the
party's words or conduct could reasonably be deemed a denial.66 Perhaps
because the very slightest evidence of a denial so thoroughly negatives
any inference of assent or acquiescence, it has been held that a denial
once made need not be repeated to a stream of accusations to be effective'
and that if the party silently nods in apparent agreement while hearing
the statement but ultimately denies it, the evidence must be excluded.'
However, a denial followed .by actual admissions of some of the accusations
60. Pulver v. Union Inv. Co., 279 Fed. 699 (8th Cir. 1922) ("You did not'live
up to your contract"); Whaley v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 294 S.W.2d 775 (19.56);
Oliver v. Louisville & N. Ry., 43 La. Ann. 804, 9 So. 431 (1891); Wolfe v. State
173 Md. 103, 194 Atl. 832 (1937); Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Catino, 330
Mass. 230, 112 N.E.2d 790 (1953); Jasmin v. Parker, 102 Vt. 405, 148 Atl. 874
(1930). Contra, Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App.2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958)
("It was all his fault"); Willhite v. Freed, 137 Ore. 1, 299 Pac. 691 (1931). In Wolfe
v. State, supra at 111, 194 Atl. at 836, the court applied the rule against opinion
declarations to exclude "the mere opinion of a third person as to the weight and
significance of facts previously admitted by the [party] .. "
61. Whaley v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 294 S.W.2d 775 (1956) (by implication);
Kelly v. Waterbury, 96 Conn. 494, 114 At. 530 (1921); Keim v. Blackburn, 280
S.W. 1046 (Mo. 1926); Jasmin v. Parker, 102 Vt. 405, 148 Atl. 874",'(1930).
The declaration is not objectionable because it takes the form 6f an inferred
insinuation addressed to the party so long as it is based on the declarant's knowledge
and otherwise has significance to the party. Belk v. Belk, 175 N.C. 69, 94 S.E. 726
(1917) ("I never forged a deed" insinuated that plaintiff had done so); In re Newman's
Will, 187 Ore. 641, 213 P.2d 137 (1950).
62. In re Thorp's Will, 150 N.C. 487, 489, 64 S.E. 379, 380 (1909).
63. State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514, 14 S.W. 625 (1890) (coroner's inquest);
In re Thorp's Will, 150 N.C. 487, 64 S.E. 379 (1909) (former trial); Blackwell Tobacco
Co. v. McElwel, 96 N.C. 71, 1 S.E. 676 (1887) (preliminary hearing).
64. People v. Willett, 92 N.Y. 29 (1883); In re Thorp's Will, 150 N.C. 487, 64
S.E. 379 (1909); Jones v. State, '184 Tenn. 128, 196 S.W.2d 491 (1946). Contra, Secor
v. Brown, 221 Md. 119, 156 A.2d 225 (1959).
65. Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 137 A.2d 139 (1957).
66. Albano v. State, 89 So.2d 342 (Fla, 1956) (dictum); Miller v. State, 158 Ga.
697, 124 S.E. 195 (1924); Carroll v. Cuffey, 20 Ill. App.2d 470, 156 N.E.2d 267(1959); Muirhead v. Challis, 213 Iowa 1108, 240 N.W. 912 (1923); People v.
Wysocki, 267 Mich. 52, 255 N.W. 160 (1934); People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90
N.E.2d 48 (1949); Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 124 Atl. 163 (1924).
67. Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Catino, 330 Mass. 230, 112 N.E.2d 790
(1953); Anderson v. State, 171 Miss. 41, 156 So. 645 (19.34) (semble).
68. Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 822 (1947).
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made renders the entire accusation and the party's total response thereto
admissible.69
If all of the foregoing "requirements" have been met and it is
assumed, for example, that a party's silence to a statement imputing fault
or the commission of a crime is probative of his belief in the imputation,
it can well be argued that his equivocal response is equally if not more
probative of such belief.70 From a practical viewpoint and in retrospect,
the fact of any response by a party obviates concern as to whether he
heard or understood the statement as these conditions may be safely
assumed.71 In Snowden v. United States,72 the trial court admitted evidence
that shortly after the alleged occurrence, the defendant was accused of
raping the declarant's niece and replied: "You did not see it; you have
got to prove it." On appeal, the court held the evidence properly received
since the defendant's "evasive and defiant answer"78 was highly probative
of guilt and clearly indicated his cognizance and comprehension of the
accusation. 74 Responses to accusations such as laughter75 or "I don't
remember"76e also have been held equivocal and hence admissible. It is
reasonable to assume that virtually any direct response short of a denial 77
of the statement will be receivable as a party's tacit admission.78 If,
however, the party denounces the speaker as a liar or otherwise casts doubt
on his veracity, it would seem that the evidence of admission should be
excluded since the reply is so clearly akin to an express denial that it
can, hardly be regarded as "equivocal. '79
69. People v. Close, 154 Cal. App.2d 545, 316 P.2d 1019 (1957); Commonwealth
v. Grieco, 323 Mass. 629, 83 N.E.2d 873 (1949).
70. See MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 52, § 247.
71. This seems to be one of the unconscious distinctions developed by the courts
between silence and equivocation. Professor Wigmore, however, would assume in all
instances, including those of a party's silence, that he heard and understood the
statement made in his presence, placing upon the party the burden of showing the
absence of these conditions. See note 21 supra.
72. 2 App. D.C. 89 (1893).
73. Id. at 93.
74. Ibid.
75. State v. Hill, 134 Mo. 663, 36 S.W. 223 (1896).
76. Jones v. State, 228 Miss. 296, 87 So.2d 573 (1956).
77. See note 66 supra.
78. E.g., People v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512 (1894) ("Do you suppose
I was a . . . fool, to tell you I was there?"); Sanders v. Newsome, 179 W. Va.
582, 19 S.E.2d 883(1942) ("If he hit the old man he didn't know nothing about it").
But cf. Kelly v. Waterbury, 96 Conn. 494, 114 AtI. 530 (1921). The equivocal
response of an agent may, as in the case of admissions generally, give rise to an
admission by his principal. Keller v. Key System Transit Lines, 129 Cal. App.2d 593,
277 P.2d 869 (1954) (railway motorman's response to police officer: "You are putting
me in an awful spot. I have given you all the information I have been instructed to
give by my employers").
79. See People v. Harrison, 26 Ill. 517, 104 N.E. 259 (1914). Contra, Belk v.
Belk, 175 N.C. 69, 94 S.E. 726 (1917) (semble). For an unrealistic rejection of
evidence based on reproval by the party, see Gibbons v. Territory, 5 Okla. Crim. 212,
115 Pac. 129 (1911) (to threats by accomplice in presence of victim's wife, party
admonished: "Hush! Don't pay any attention to her. She in [sic] only half-witted
anyway").
[VOL. XV
ADMISSIONS BY ACQUIESCENCE
It has likewise been held that when, in response to police interrogations,
an accused refuses to answer any questions on advice of counsel8° or
repeatedly insists on his right to see his attorney before making comment,"'
the evidence should be excluded since the circumstances, apart from that
of arrest,82 "are reinforced by an explicit rebuttal of any inference that the
accused was admitting the truth of the accusations .... *83
In addition to the traditional requirements for admissibility and as
further evidence of the cautious regard by the courts for tacit admissions
generally,84 other limitations and safeguards on the use of such admissions
should be noted. While there are ill-considered statements by some courts
to the effect that a party's silence creates a "presumption" of admission,85
it is unquestionably the prevailing and sounder view that only an inference
of acquiescence or assent arises,88 i.e., the party-opponent may refrain from
introducing any evidence to dispel the fact of his admission without the
risk of suffering a peremptory ruling by the court.87 The requirements
themselves indicate that an imposing evidentiary burden is cast on one
who would establish his opponent's admission by silence; absent an
"affirmative showing"88 that all of the elements of admission exist, the
evidence must be excluded 89 In Anderson v. State,90 the defendants were
charged with assault and battery with intent to murder. Over objection,
the trial court admitted testimony by police officers that shortly after their
arrest, the defendants were confronted with a witness who identified them
as the assailants. Both defendants admitted the meeting in their testimony
but denied any connection with the crime. The appellate court reversed
the conviction, holding that the state had clearly failed to meet its
80. Autrey v. State, 94 Fla. 229, 114 So. 244 (1927) (dictum); People v. Conrow,
200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943 (1911). Contra, People v. Graney, 48 Cal. App. 773,
192 Pac. 460 (1920). Compare People v. Wilson, 61 Cal. App. 611, 215 Pac. 565(1923), with People v. Hanley, 317 I11. 39, 147 N.E. 400 (1925) ("It will take twelve
men to try me" -excluded).
81. Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
82. See note 50 supra.
83. Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
84. See note 14 supra.
85. E.g., Anderson v. State, 171 Miss. 41, 43, 156 So. 645, 646 (1934) (dictum);
People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 374, 48 N.E. 730, 736 (1897).
86. Albano v. State, 89 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1956); Rude v. Seibert, 22 I11. App.2d
477, 161 N.E.2d 39 (1959); People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943 (1911);
Camper v. State, 187 Tenn. 511, 216 S.W.2d 18 (1948) (error to charge that
presumption of guilt arises from silence to accusations).
87. For a discussion of the problems raised by careless use of the terms and a
recent Florida experience with the problem, see Note, 13 U. MIAMI L. REv. 236,
237 (1958).
88. Quillin v. Colquhoun, 42 Idaho 522, 247 Pac. 740 (1926); Sanders v.
Overaker, 141 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Reall v. Deiriggi, 127 W. Va. 662,
34 S.E.2d 253 (1945).
89. Weller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 192 Atl. 317 (1937); State v.
Jackson, 150 N.C. 831, 64 S.E. 376 (1909).
90. 171 Miss. 41, 156 So. 645 (1934).
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burden of proof in not eliciting testimony from the officers or the defendants
as to what response if any was made to the witness."'
As is the case with hearsay exceptions generally,9 2 the party whose
admission is sought to be established is entitled to have the jury members
instructed as to the limited purpose for which they may consider the
evidence and that they may not give weight to the hearsay statement
itself.93 However, the party-opponent's right to such a cautionary instruction
is waived if the instruction is not seasonably requested. 4
But even favorable jury instructions may often be grossly inadequate
to protect the party-opponent against the practical danger of suffering a
jury defeat on hearsay evidence.95 For any number of reasons that have
been discussed, his adversary may fail to establish the offered admission
at trial and yet succeed in exposing the jury to the hearsay statement.
Once the jury has heard the statement, particularly where it is accusatory
in nature, the damage has been done and it matters not that the party-
opponent's objections have been sustained and the jury is later cautioned
to disregard the evidence. More effective measures were employed in
People v. Conrow,96 a prosecution for murder. During the defendant's
cross examination, the state was permitted to show that an alleged accom-
plice had seen the defendant in jail in the presence of police officers
and had then narrated in great detail the defendant's part in the crime,
although it was also established at the very onset of the examination
that the defendant had indicated to the officers at the meeting he would
not answer any questions on instructions of counsel. Notwithstanding the
state's deliberate and meticulous references to the accomplice's statement,
the trial court repeatedly denied the defendant's motions to strike. However,
at the very end of the trial, defendant's motion to strike was granted
and the jury admonished that the defendant's silence could not be used
against him. The conviction was reversed, the court holding that a new
trial was necessary. The court noted the trial judge's vacillation and
that his final ruling was made as clear to the jury as it was possible to
do, but realistically granted a new trial since it could not be said
91. Accord, People v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512 (1894); Miller v. State,
158 Ga. 697, 124 S.E. 195 (1924).
92. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1730 (3d ed. 1940).
93. See People v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512 (1894); Doherty v. Edwards,
227 Iowa 1264, 290 N.W. 672 (1940). Compare Albano v. State, 89 So.2d 342
(Fla. 1956), with Roberts v. State, 94 Fla. 149, 113 So. 726 (1927). It is significant
to note that the most thorough exposition of the Florida position with regard to
acquiescent admissions appears in a trial court's charge to the jnr which was approved
as a correct statement of the law" in the Roberts case. Id. at 156, 113 So. at 729.
94. Doherty v. Edwards, 227 Iowa 1264, 290 N.W. 672 (1940); State v. Kysilka,
84 N.J.L. 6, 87 Atl. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
95. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
96. 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943 (1911).
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"that the statements and charges of [the accomplice] . . . erroneously
received, although stricken out, did not affect the result." 91
While it is quite apparent that the once prevalent practice 98 of freely
admitting anything said in a party's presence has been greatly curtailed,
it is equally clear that effective protective measures must continuously
be utilized by the courts if this form of hearsay evidence is deemed worth
receiving. If the underlying considerations of relevancy are given their
due, it may well become evident in some situations that the evidentiary
value of the offered admission is slight compared to the undue prejudice
and confusion resulting from its reception and that therefore it should
be excluded.99 Only by a realistic evaluative approach to this often vexing
problem can the courts intelligently utilize the tacit admission and yet
do justice to the rights of the party-opponent.
97. Id. at 369, 93 N.E. at 948. Accord, Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485, 153
A.2d 833 (1959), modifying 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958).
98. See note 7 supra.
99. At least in criminal trials, it would certainly be consonant with the lay
conception of the law's protections to exclude all evidence of silence to accusatory
statements after arrest. See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 410, at 166 (12th ed.
1955).
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